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Abstract. Miners play a key role in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin:
they invest substantial computational resources in processing transac-
tions and minting new currency units. It is well known that an attacker
controlling more than half of the network’s mining power could manip-
ulate the state of the system at will. While the influence of large mining
pools appears evenly split, the actual distribution of mining power within
these pools and their economic relationships with other actors remain
undisclosed. To this end, we conduct the first in-depth analysis of mining
reward distribution within three of the four largest Bitcoin mining pools
and examine their cross-pool economic relationships. Our results suggest
that individual miners are simultaneously operating across all three pools
and that in each analyzed pool a small number of actors (≤ 20) receives
over 50% of all BTC payouts. While the extent of an operator’s control
over the resources of a mining pool remains an open debate, our findings
are in line with previous research, pointing out centralization tendencies
in large mining pools and cryptocurrencies in general.
1 Introduction
The distribution of mining power or hash rate can be seen as a key indicator for
the market shares of mining pools and represents a core security parameter in
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies relying on Nakamoto consensus [23,12,29,32].
An attacker in control of the majority of the network’s hash rate is capable of ma-
nipulating the system at will, i.e., executing double spending attacks, prohibiting
transactions from entering the blockchain and effectively rewriting the transac-
tion history within computational limits. However, concentrations even below
this barrier open up the possibility for effective selfish-mining attacks and its
variants [10,25,30,14]. Since the hash rate distribution is not directly observable
in the public blockchain, it is currently estimated retroactively by attributing
mined blocks to known mining pools and counting their relative frequency.
Statistics published by popular analytics platforms4 indicate that the overall
mining power is concentrated among a relatively small number of pools, with
4 Including but not limited to https://blockchain.info/charts
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BTC.com, ViaBTC and AntPool holding—or being close to hold—the majority,
but none of them exceeding the 50% limit. However, large miners and pools
could have an incentive to conceal or obfuscate the actual extent of their mining
power. If successful, this would allow to maximize market shares and profits
without visibly harming the security and credibility of the underlying system,
ideally maintaining the stability of revenue streams.
Despite its relevance for security considerations, measurement studies on the
level of mining-power centralization are still scarce. Recently, a study of miner
centralization on the P2P network layer by Gencer et. al [13] found that over
50% of the mining power has exclusively been shared by eight miners in Bitcoin
and five miners in Ethereum for prolonged periods. In [26], two novel methods
to accurately estimate network hash rates are proposed, however, without pro-
viding empirical results. Judmayer et al. perform an analysis of mining power
distribution in merge-mined cryptocurrencies, showing the latter exhibits vul-
nerabilities to centralization by large mining pools [18]. A series of blog posts on
the distribution of Bitcoin mining shares covering the period between early 2012
and late 2016 [3] are consistent with the results reported by Gencer et. al [13].
Contributions. In this paper we expand on existing research, aiming at shed-
ding light on the distribution of mining rewards in Bitcoin. Specifically, we con-
duct an empirical analysis of mined blocks and mining reward payout patterns
to present a clearer picture on how mining pools operate and how the mining
reward assigned to operators is further distributed to individual miners enabling
the analysis of monetary flows and economic relationships. We leverage attri-
bution techniques described in [18], improve their accuracy by incorporating in-
formation from existing online analysis platforms [5,1] and apply multiple-input
clustering [16,2] for identifying address clusters that are likely to be controlled
by the same actor. Summarizing, our contributions are as follows:
1. We combined several sources of miner and pool attribution data and present
a simple yet effective method for attributing blocks to mining pools. Using
this method, we were able to attribute approximately 35K blocks more than
blockchain.info and analyzed the longitudinal evolution of the mining pool
market share distribution in Bitcoin over a 5-year period.
2. We investigate payout patterns of three mining pools that together exceeded
the 50% threshold (between the end of 2017 and mid-2018) and analyze how
mining rewards are distributed from pools to individual miners within a four-
week observation period. Our results show that in each of the three pools,
a small number of address clusters (≤ 20) receives over 50% of all payouts,
suggesting a relatively strong centralization.
3. We examine economic relationships of miners, reveal cross-pool mining ac-
tivities and find that geographically co-located exchange services and wallet
providers are major receivers of minted coins.
4. We publicly release our findings on addresses, pools and mining entities, as
well as the code to reproduce our results and improve the current knowl-
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edge about Bitcoin mining and involved actors at https://github.com/
MatteoRomiti/Deep Dive BTC Mining Pools.
Outline. First, in Section 2, we introduce the necessary background on Bitcoin
mining and mining pools. Then we go on and present our empirical analysis
and the results we obtained in Section 3. We finish by discussing our findings in
Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Background
In this section, we briefly introduce central notions used throughout this paper.
While we do not attempt to give a complete introduction to the underlying
technology of Bitcoin and permissionless cryptocurrencies, we direct the reader
to existing literature, such as [23,6,34,24].
2.1 Bitcoin Mining and Mining Pools
One of the key innovations of Bitcoin’s Nakamoto consensus is the successful im-
plementation of a random leader election process in a dynamically changing set
of pseudonymous participants. Thereby, each node taking part in the consensus
mechanism is required to solve a memoryless and non-invertible cryptographic
puzzle, i.e., provide a Proof-of-Work (PoW). In Bitcoin, the latter is represented
by a partial-preimage attack on the SHA-256 algorithm, whereby participants
must brute-force the hash over the transactions defining the new state of the
system and some additional information, including the reference to the last seen
block and a random nonce. To become leader, participants, also referred to as
miners, must provide a hash which is not only valid but also fulfills the network’s
current difficulty requirements, i.e., lies below a specified target value. The dif-
ficulty is adjusted every 2016 blocks (est. two weeks), such that the average
interval at which PoW solutions are found is approximately 10 minutes.
Due to the structure of PoW, the time between each two found blocks in
Bitcoin is exponentially distributed, yielding the number of found blocks per
time period a Poisson process. The rate parameter is thereby defined by the
ratio of PoW difficulty to the overall mining power present in the network. As
such, solo miners are expected to face a high variance of payouts, depending on
their share of the overall mining power. Consequently, miners collude to form
so-called mining pools, where participants work together towards finding the
next block and share rewards based on each miner’s contribution and according
to some reward distribution scheme. As such, since the appearance of the first
mining pools in Bitcoin, the fraction of blocks generated by solo miners has
steadily declined and is negligible today.
The rising competition among mining pools has been shown to motivate
adversarial strategies, such as denial-of-service attacks [17,19]. Other, less de-
tectable, attack techniques such as block withholding [9,20,8,28] and spy min-
ing [33,10] have been observed and studied. A recent economic model suggests
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miners will refrain from attacking the underlying blockchain as long as the rev-
enue received from honest behavior exceeds the one-off benefit yielded by at-
tacks [7].
2.2 Reward Distribution in Mining Pools
At the time of writing, major pools direct their mining revenue to publicly known
addresses, specified in the output of a block’s coinbase transaction. We refer to
this address as reward address. Furthermore, mining pools have been observed
to usually reveal their identity by adding human-readable text or markers to the
coinbase. The reward address, often used for prolonged periods by a pool, can
thereby be used (i) to directly distribute block rewards to pool members, which
can be identified by a set of miners’ addresses, or (ii) to send the newly minted
coins to a collector address, which is used to hold larger amounts of BTC so as to
perform payments to pool members when necessary. We refer to the transaction
by which pool members receive their mining reward share as payout transaction.
Such transactions are often characterized by a large number of output addresses,
each receiving a reward usually in the order of a few mBTC, as our findings show
in Section 3.2.
While the exact structures of payout schemes vary from mining pool to min-
ing pool and also with time, the general principle is the same: mining pool
operators distribute the template for the next to-be-generated block to partic-
ipating miners and require the latter to submit PoW solutions meeting some
minimal difficulty. These “partial” solutions are referred to as shares and serve
as a measure of each miner’s contribution. Using this information, the min-
ing pool operators distribute the revenue among participating miners, based on
some pre-defined scheme. An overview of the main classes of reward distribution
schemes employed by mining pools, as well as discussions on fairness, is provided
in [28,31].
3 Analysis
As a starting point of our investigation, in Section 3.1, we quantify the overall
market share of Bitcoin mining pools by attributing Bitcoin blocks to known
mining pools. Next, in Section 3.2, we identify individual miners and investigate
revenue streams, obtaining a more accurate picture of the distribution of mining
rewards within pools. Finally, in Section 3.3, we investigate the economic rela-
tionships between pools and other actors in the Bitcoin ecosystem. The analysis
results in the rest of this paper are based on Bitcoin blocks 0-556400 (3 Jan.
2009 - 31 Dec. 2018).
3.1 Market Shares of Bitcoin Mining Pools
The first step of our analysis consists of attributing mined blocks to mining enti-
ties, i.e., pools and individual miners. Thereby, we leverage two main information
sources: coinbase markers and coinbase transaction output addresses.
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We have seen that the coinbase field of the coinbase transaction, is usually
used by miners to place so-called coinbase markers [18] — also called coinbase
tags or signatures — in order to claim blocks publicly. This enables mining pool
members to monitor their respective pool activity and allows estimating the
overall mining power of pools. Providing this information is also relevant for
miners to publicly show that they support certain forks by setting the respective
version bits using a signaling mechanism5. As already noted in [18], this infor-
mation is not cryptographically secured and hence can easily be faked by the
miner of a block. Therefore, it is reasonable to rely on the reward address as a
primary data source for block attribution, as modifications to the latter, e.g. to
impersonate a different mining entity, result in the loss of the associated mining
reward.
In our observation period, only 5.1% of all blocks exhibited more than one
coinbase output address, from which most occurred in the early days of Bitcoin.
We note that coinbase transactions, which have more than one output address,
can theoretically contain ordinary payouts performed by the pool and therefore
might not be directly mappable to one single entity directly. For example, P2Pool
and Eligius use the coinbase transaction to payout shares of the block reward
without an intermediary transaction.
Although there are several online resources (e.g., blockchain.info, btc.com,
blocktrail.com, etc.) which provide aggregated charts regarding the shares miners
hold in various cryptocurrencies, their exact methodology of how they attribute
blocks to individual miners/pools often remains undisclosed, as for example with
blocktrail.com. If underlying attribution/mapping data is publicly available, it
sometimes is outdated, as it is the case for blockchain.info, or diverges between
services, as it is the case for btc.com.
Data provided by btc.com was forked from the information provided by
blockchain.info but tends to use different miner/pool names which makes unifi-
cation of mapping information a highly manual task. To map blocks to mining
entities we retrieve mapping information from the following sources and merge
them into a single file:
– the official Blockchain.info Github repository6 that, according to its docu-
mentation, is the basis for this visualization https://www.blockchain.com/
pools,
– the official BTC.com Github repository7 that, according to its documenta-
tion, is the basis for this visualization https://btc.com/stats/pool
– mappings performed by Blocktrail.com8. However, we do not have precise
information about how Blocktrail attributed blocks and this API was closed
5 https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0135.mediawiki
6 https://raw.githubusercontent.com/blockchain/Blockchain-Known-Pools/
29ab27c844ebdb63110f8783f73b9decd4abc221/pools.json
7 https://raw.githubusercontent.com/btccom/Blockchain-Known-Pools/
650a92227bf65b06ff0a5b58bb57c13856a3babf/pools.json
8 https://www.blocktrail.com/api
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while working on this paper. Therefore, we don’t have Blocktrail mapping
information for blocks after 514239.
– manually retrieved coinbase markers from coinbase transactions,
– multiple-input cluster information obtained from the GraphSense tool [2].
Given these mappings, our methodology for attributing blocks to mining
entities is depicted in Figure 1. First, we unify the names used by different
sources to indicate equality of entities in our mapping file. This ensures that
each mining entity can be uniquely identified, regardless of the source used.
For each block, we first check whether some mining entity is associated with
the coinbase output address. Recall, we consider this the most reliable source of
information for attribution in a block, as providing wrong data here would result
in the miner giving away funds. If the reward address cannot be identified, e.g
in cases where the reward address is not yet attributed to a mining entity or
the coinbase transaction has multiple outputs, we proceed to check the coinbase
marker. If a match is found and there is only one coinbase output address, this
address is added to the list of reward addresses of the corresponding mining
entity. Moreover, the respective mining entity is added to the list of attributions
for this block, alongside the source(s) used for the attribution.
check if 
output address 
matches  
block has 
only one output
address   
add output address
to mining entity 
start attribution
check if 
marker matches
check if 
marker matches
next mining 
entity available  
stop attributionnext blockavailable  
attribute block
to mining entity 
yes
no
yes
yes no
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
no
Fig. 1. High level flow chart representing our attribution scheme.
If all sources attribute the same entity to a block, we call this mapping
unique. Only in 684 out of 556400 blocks (0.0012%), we encountered conflicts,
i.e., the block was attributed to two or more mining entities. Conflicts mostly
occurred for blocks that were attributed to BTC.TOP and CANOE at the same
time, as well as Waterhole and BTC.com, or Tang Pool and Bixin. Despite
being just a small fraction of blocks, it shows that publicly available resources
for Bitcoin analysis are not always precise and accurate. Sometimes even the
information coming from a single source is inconsistent and would attribute a
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single block to different miners. For example, only using the pool information
from Blockchain.info blocks 482059 and 482221 are attributed to Waterhole
(based on address) as well as BTC.com (based on coinbase). Other examples
can be found in BTC pool information, which is used in our attribution scheme:
block 524045, for instance, is attributed to BitcoinRussia and Bitcoin-Ukraine;
16 other blocks (476422, 478113, 482242, 482614, 483576, . . .) are attributed to
CANOE and BTC.TOP.
Overall, with our method, we attributed more blocks than any other source
considered alone. As an example, if we consider blocks from 500000 to 556400 we
attributed 54409 blocks, which is 2568 (∼ 32100 BTC) more than it would be
possible by only using pool information from blockchain.info. A comparison of
different attribution data sources is shown in Table 1, while the conflicts in our
final attributed dataset are distributed as shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Comparison of different attribution data sources for miners and pools from
block 0 to 556400. The column direct use refers to using the provided mapping informa-
tion directly on every block without adding newly identified addresses by markers. The
column our attribution refers to the procedure described in Figure 1. For blocktrail.com
we only have a list of blocks up to 514, 239 with the respective associated attribution,
therefore there cannot be any conflicts. Combined contains all previously mentioned
sources as well as GraphSense and manually identified coinbase markers.
Source Direct use
Direct use
conflicts
Our attribution
Our attribution
conflicts
blockchain.info 334,416 2 339,597 5
btc.com 337,629 3 342,619 22
blocktrail.com 324,720 - - -
combined - - 375,381 684
Table 2. Conflicts in final attribution. The last conflict between F2Pool and BTCC
Pool is probably due to a misattribution by blocktrail.com as all other sources attribute
the respective block to F2Pool.
Miner 1 Miner 2 Number of conflicts Example blocks
BTC.TOP CANOE 338 516210, 516275, . . .
Bixin TangPool 142 339210, 339284, . . .
BTC.com Waterhole 113 478230, 478328, . . .
BTC.TOP WAYI.CN 81 509073, 509100, . . .
ViaBTC Okminer 5 510279, 523217,
Yourbtc OzCoin 3 159846, 159929, 159964
BitcoinRussia Bitcoin-Ukraine 1 524045
F2Pool BTCC Pool 1 482886
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Evolution of mining pool market shares. Having attributed blocks to min-
ing pools, we can now analyze how their shares have evolved over time. Figure 2
shows the evolution of mining shares between 2013-12-21 and 2018-12-19, aggre-
gated in bins spanning 2, 016 blocks, which corresponds to Bitcoin’s difficulty
adjustment period. The gray region represents small known pools or miners for
which the sum of all its percentages is below 4%. It also indicates the 50% min-
ing power threshold (red line) and the Gini coefficient (black line) as a measure
of market share distribution (between 0 and 1). The higher the Gini value, the
stronger the inequality among market’s participants. The evolution of the Gini
coefficient shows peaks of mining power centralization around June 2014, April
2016 and January 2018, almost in a cyclical fashion (roughly a 22-month period).
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Fig. 2. Evolution of mining pool market shares in Bitcoin between 2013-12-21 and
2018-12-19. The red line indicates the 50% security threshold, while the black line is
the Gini coefficient as a measure of market share distribution.
Regarding the evolution of mining pools’ market shares, we can observe that
the distribution has changed over time. Pools dominating mining now (BTC.com,
ViaBTC and BTC.TOP) did not exist in early 2016 and, vice versa, most of the
largest pools in 2016 (e.g., BTCC, Bitfury and BW Pool) are now much smaller
players. We can also observe that, from January until mid-2018, three pools
combined held more than 50% of the overall mining power. In particular, the first
two (BTC.com and AntPool) are owned by Bitmain, the leader among mining
hardware manufacturers. Another interesting observation is that the number of
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unknown blocks which could not be attributed to a mining entity has increased
lately to a level last observed 2015.
3.2 Mining Reward Distribution
In the previous section, we saw how mining shares are distributed among pools
and how they evolved over time. Before we can further investigate revenue
streams within and across mining pools, we need to understand how pool op-
erators split the block reward among individual miners and identify as many
payout transactions as possible. From now on, we will focus our analysis on
three pools (BTC.com, AntPool and ViaBTC) that held the majority of mining
power at the beginning of 2018. Since payout distribution schemes also change
over time, we further limit our study to a four-week observation period ranging
from block 510,000 (2018-02-19) to 514,032 (2018-03-18) when each major pool
almost always followed a distinctive and stable payout pattern (see Figure 3).
This allows us to identify payout transactions while reducing the number of
false positive transactions that do not represent payments to individual miners.
To verify that the identified payout transactions are indeed within reasonable
bounds, we compare the amount of BTC paid out via these transactions with
the amount of BTC received by the pool in the same period, as described in
detail in Section 3.3. We identify transactions from mining pools to individual
miners using the following, pool-specific heuristics:
– BTC.com received block rewards always in the same reward address de-
noted as A1 in Figure 3a and used one collector address, denoted as A2, for
distributing mining rewards to pool members. That address was also used as
change address in payout transactions and the payments continue in a chain-
like fashion. Supposing that only this address was used to transfer funds to
pool members, we selected all its payout transactions within the examined
period, each having a large number of outputs (in the order of 103) with
relatively low amounts of revenues associated (few mBTC).
– AntPool also collected most of the mined coins using a single address. As
in BTC.com, they have always been sent to one collector address responsible
for payments (A2 in Figure 3c), but, differently from BTC.com, the chain of
payments continues with a series of change addresses that are never reused. A
peculiar aspect of these payout transactions is that a significant percentage
of them9 has 101 output addresses (change address included). Because of
that, in order to identify the change address in a payout transaction, we
investigate all output addresses that spent the received amount through
another payout transaction with 101 output addresses. In the time period
considered, it turns out that the change addresses were always the output
with the largest sum of BTC. By following this series of change addresses and
payout transactions, we identified several other addresses as being individual
miners, i.e., members of the pool.
9 The exact percentage and more details are provided in the Section 3.3.
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(a) BTC.com payout pattern. (b) ViaBTC payout pattern.
(c) AntPool payout pattern.
Fig. 3. Payout patterns observed in the time period between block 510,000 and 514,032.
In gray: reward addresses, in red: addresses performing payout transactions, in blue:
pool members, in green: change addresses. Rounded squares are coinbases of blocks
mined by the pool. The size of the nodes indicates the differences in received BTC per
transaction per address. In BTC.com (Figure 3a) payout transactions are performed by
one single collector address. In ViaBTC (Figure 3b), payout transactions are performed
by a dozen of addresses (always changing), receiving 10 BTC each from one single
reward address. In AntPool (Figure 3c), similarly to BTC.com, we have a payout chain
that originates from always the same collector address, but continues with other change
addresses used only once as input in payout transactions.
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– ViaBTC followed a payout pattern similar to the one represented in Fig-
ure 3b, where a dozen of addresses always received a sum of exactly 10 BTC,
which was then spent in payout transactions, again with a few hundred out-
puts and small sums of BTC. Since the dozen of addresses was not fixed,
we investigate all transactions that received 10 BTC from the ViaBTC re-
ward address. We must report that, in this case, we could not consistently
distinguish the pool’s change address from the members’ addresses.
Identification of individual miners. Having identified payout transactions,
we can now extract Bitcoin addresses belonging to individual miners. Further-
more, we can partition these addresses into maximal subsets (clusters) that are
likely to be controlled by the same actor using the well-known [11,27] and effi-
cient [15] multiple-input clustering heuristics. The underlying intuition is that
if two addresses (i.e.: A and B) are used as inputs in the same transaction
while one of these addresses along with another address (i.e: B and C) are used
as inputs in another transaction, then the three addresses (A, B and C) must
somehow be controlled by the same actor [21], who conducted both transactions
and therefore possesses the private keys corresponding to all three addresses.
This heuristic fails when CoinJoin transactions 10 are taken into account be-
cause they combine payments from different spenders that do not necessarily
represent one single entity. Aware of this problem, we filtered those transactions
before applying the multiple input heuristics.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for each investigated mining pool: the
number of blocks mined by each pool (NB), the number of identified payout
transactions (NTX), the number of addresses belonging to individual miners
(NA) and the number of identified clusters (NC) within each pool. In order to
estimate the real-world coverage of our dataset, we compared the mining reward
(BTCM ) associated to mined blocks with the payouts associated to individual
miners’ addresses (BTCP ). This shows that we were—within our observation
period and provided that payouts happen regularly—able to identify 92% of
the individual miners in BTC.com, 30% in AntPool and 75% in ViaBTC. We
hypothesize that the low percentage obtained for AntPool lies on the relatively
strict filter criterion we applied on its payout pattern (transactions with exactly
101 outputs). We also investigated how often individual miners reused addresses
within a pool and found that the median address reuse µ is much higher in
BTC.com than in AntPool and ViaBTC. When we normalize the median address
reuse by the number of identified payout addresses
µ
NA
, we see that AntPool is
the outlier, which could mean that its members are more careful about privacy
or are changing their payout addresses at a faster rate compared to the other
pools. The fact that the number of blocks mined is greater than the number
of payments we detected can be due to two reasons: pool managers distribute
the mining rewards not at every mined block, but within a longer time period,
combining payments to minimize the transaction fees and, as already noted
10 https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/CoinJoin
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above, because we didn’t manage to find all payout transactions performed by
pools.
Table 3. Statistics of retrieved data within the observed period. NB : number of blocks
mined by the pool, NTX : number of identified payout transactions, NA: number of
identified members’ addresses, NC : number of identified clusters, BTCM : BTC mined
by the pool, BTCP : BTC paid to pool members (addresses), µ: median value of address
reuse.
Pool Name NB NTX NA NC BTCM BTCP
BTCP
BTCM
µ
µ
NA
BTC.com 1,020 225 20,444 8,900 13,059 12,057 92% 20 9.8 ×10−4
AntPool 617 408 14,166 5,082 7,887 2,333 30% 2 1.4 ×10−4
ViaBTC 457 104 7,171 3,121 5,841 4,284 75% 5 7.0 ×10−4
Centralization of mining shares within pools. Previously, in Section 3.1,
we saw that the mining shares are centralized among a relatively small number
of pools. However, little is known about the centralization of mining shares inside
each pool. We gain insight into pool centralization by looking at the distribution
of a pool’s mining shares to identified clusters (NC), which represent actors
within each pool. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of mining shares
among members (clusters) for each pool.
In order to investigate how the internal mining distribution changed over
time, we expand our dataset (blocks 510,000 to 514,032) by payout transactions
for BTC.com from block 550,000 (2018-11-14) to 554,032 (2018-12-16). We chose
BTC.com because its payout transactions can easily be identified, as discussed
before. In Figure 4 the blue and light-blue lines show the cumulative sum of
BTC.com for both periods and it can be observed that the distribution of mining
shares within that pool remained relatively stable over time.
Although our dataset covers just a fraction of Bitcoin’s overall mining ac-
tivity, we notice that 50% of the mining power in ViaBTC is controlled by 7
clusters, compared to 20 clusters for BTC.com and 15 clusters for AntPool. De-
spite this, if we compute the Gini coefficient on these shares we get 0.945 for
BTC.com, 0.942 for ViaBTC and 0.938 for AntPool, which indicates that the
distribution of mining shares is highly centralized within all investigated pools.
We note and discuss later that clusters do not necessarily represent individuals
but also larger actors such as exchanges or wallet providers.
3.3 Miners in the Bitcoin Ecosystem
Having identified individual miners within pools by their Bitcoin addresses and
cluster affiliation, we can now turn our focus on individual miners participating
in several pools and lay out their economic relationships to other actors in the
Bitcoin ecosystem within our observation period.
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Fig. 4. Cumulative sum of mining shares over clusters (actors) for each pool (log-scale).
Black-dotted lines highlight the number of clusters controlling 50% of each pool.
Cross-Pool Mining If a single Bitcoin address receives payouts from several
mining pools, we can assume that the individual miner holding that address
conducts cross-pool mining. Table 4 shows the number of addresses involved in
cross-pool mining for each pair of pools, their respective clusters, as well as the
total amount of BTC received by these entities from the pools. We notice that
the BTC.com-AntPool pair is the one with the highest overlaps (addresses in
common, clusters in common and BTC received), which might be a result of the
common mining pool ownership as discussed in Section 3.1. However, it must
be noted that these figures only represent the fraction of addresses that were
reused across clusters; individual miners creating separate addresses for each of
their mining activities are immune to multiple-input clustering and therefore not
represented in this table.
Table 4. Cross-pool mining at address level in the time period between block 510,000
and 514,032 (∼ 4 weeks), including how much BTC from each pool has been received
by those common addresses.
Pool 1 Pool 2
Addresses
in common
Clusters
in common
BTC from
Pool 1
BTC from
Pool 2
BTC.com AntPool 537 (1.58%) 434 (3.2%) 664.3 (5.5%) 176.8 (7.6%)
AntPool ViaBTC 115 (0.54%) 196 (2.4%) 11.1 (0.47%) 102.6 (2.4%)
ViaBTC BTC.com 250 (0.91%) 267 (2.3%) 175.4 (4.1%) 174.1 (1.4%)
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Next, we uncover the actors behind the clusters reported in Table 4 using
publicly available tags from blockchain.info and walletexplorer.com. In Table 5
we report the main actors that have been receiving shares of block rewards from
the three pools analyzed. For each entity-pool pair, the table shows the amount of
BTC received by the entity from the pool, its share within the pool and the num-
ber of addresses associated with the cluster representing that actor. The majority
of actors is Unknown, which means that we could not find tags attributing the
associated addresses to actors. Excluding this last set which together accounts
for more than 65% of the shares in each pool, we see that the mining rewards are
distributed to cryptocurrency exchanges (E) and wallet providers (W). The top
exchanges listed in Table 5 (Bixin, Huobi.com) hold, in combination, relatively
strong mining shares within each pool (BTC.com: 20,51%, AntPool: 16,43%,
ViaBTC: 24.02%) and can, therefore, be regarded as major forces pushing the
centralization of mining shares within pools, as reported before in Section 3.2.
However, it must be noted that exchanges typically do not participate in min-
ing activities themselves but host wallets of individual miners. Nevertheless, we
point out that exchanges and wallet providers are usually operated by a single
physical or legal entity and the ownership of assets is often unclear unless users
withdraw cryptocurrency units into self-controlled hot or cold wallets [4].
Furthermore, we can also observe a geographical co-location of mining pool
operators and payout services: the same top exchanges have (or had11) strong
ties with China, which is where the three observed mining pool operators are
located.
Table 5. Cross-pool mining at a cluster level in the time period between block 510,000
and 514,032 (∼ 4 weeks). For each unknown entity or known actor, it is shown the
amount of BTC received by each pool, its share in the pool, the number of addresses
linked to it and the type of service it offers (W: wallet provider, E: cryptocurrency
exchange service, P: known mining pool, M: unknown mining entity).
BTC.com AntPool ViaBTC
Entity/Actor Service BTC %BTC #Addr. BTC %BTC #Addr. BTC %BTC #Addr. Total BTC
Unknown ? 8930.39 74.07 13286 1682.25 72.09 8888 2877.02 67.17 4845 13489.67
Bixin W+E+P 1663.75 13.80 1061 241.28 10.34 546 795.36 18.57 476 2700.39
Huobi.com E 808.64 6.71 964 142.04 6.09 759 225.50 5.27 322 1176.19
Bittrex.com E 83.71 0.69 348 29.56 1.27 251 43.36 1.01 177 156.63
Xapo.com W 26.96 0.22 94 70.75 3.03 64 5.79 0.14 33 103.50
Poloniex.com E 42.65 0.35 381 11.52 0.49 268 19.97 0.47 139 74.15
Luno.com W+E 36.59 0.30 258 4.06 0.17 104 4.39 0.10 60 45.04
Bitstamp.net E 8.94 0.07 57 3.55 0.15 38 3.91 0.09 22 16.39
Cryptonator.com W+E 5.75 0.05 80 0.70 0.03 41 2.70 0.06 33 9.15
BitoEX.com W 5.09 0.04 23 1.12 0.05 35 2.19 0.05 4 8.39
CoinHako.com W+E 3.59 0.03 4 0.29 0.01 3 0.24 0.01 2 4.12
Bitcoin.de E 1.86 0.02 26 0.76 0.03 13 0.58 0.01 7 3.19
11 https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/11/02/cryptocurrency-
exchanges-officially-dead-in-china/#48116a6a2a83
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Economic relationships in the Bitcoin ecosystem Having identified and
partly de-anonymized the actors that were mining with the three analyzed pools
within our observation period, we can now illustrate the economic relationships
among mining pools and other actors in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Figure 5 shows
the flow of mining rewards from mining pools to the clusters representing actors
within pools. We selected the first 400 clusters12 from each pool and grouped
together clusters representing unknown entities in one node (1,118 in total).
From our analysis, it is clear that the vast majority of mined coins go to unknown
entities that we grouped into one Unknown entry in Table 5.
Unknown
Luno.com
BitoEX.com
ViaBTC
Bittrex.com
CoinHako.com
AntPool
MercadoBitcoin.com.br
Bixin
Cryptonator.com
Xapo.com
CoinPayments.net
Huobi.com
Poloniex.com
Bitcoin.de
FYBSG.com
Bitstamp.net
Telco 214
OkCoin.com
CoinSpot.com.au
Hashnest.comBTC.com
Fig. 5. Flow of mining rewards from mining pools to their members. The strength of
the arcs is scaled by payment volume, while the node size depends on the total amount
of received (mined) BTC. In black: wallet services and exchanges, in gray: unknown
entities. This plot covers the top 400 clusters from each mining pool sorted by received
BTC. Unknown entities (1118) were combined into one node.
Inspecting the Unknown We now focus on the 10 largest entities within
the Unknown by inspecting basic statistical properties of the underlying address
clusters. In Table 6, we report for each cluster its internal ID (assigned by Graph-
Sense), the amount of BTC received by each cluster from each pool, the total
revenues from mining, as well as the total amount of BTC received (as of April,
23rd 2018). When further inspecting the total number of addresses in those
clusters we can observe that all of them consist of more than 30,000 addresses
and one of them (cluster 324067473 with 11,534,706 addresses) is a so-called
12 Sorted by received BTC. This number covers at least 85% of the mining shares for
each pool.
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super-cluster [15]. 9 clusters have been receiving a relatively large number of
transactions for more than a year, 2 clusters (cluster 327539880 and 324067473)
for more than 4 years. While not being verifiable without having attribution
data, those statistics suggest that the ten largest unknown mining clusters also
represent untagged exchange services or wallet providers.
Table 6. Cross-pool mining of the ten largest unknown mining clusters sorted by total
amount of BTC received by the three pools in the time period between block 510,000
and 514,032 (∼ 4 weeks).
BTC.com AntPool ViaBTC
Cluster ID BTC %BTC BTC %BTC BTC %BTC
Mined
BTC
Total BTC
Received
327539880 409.34 3.40 122.10 5.23 258.55 6.04 789.99 521,939
324067473 295.02 2.45 90.44 3.88 189.15 4.42 574.61 3,756,583
350822682 244.77 2.03 9.29 0.40 182.92 4.27 436.98 110,566
350824718 244.67 2.03 65.65 2.81 46.20 1.08 356.52 112,680
333653856 153.02 1.27 54.02 2.31 83.60 1.95 290.63 130,680
372448840 181.10 1.50 33.64 1.44 55.73 1.30 270.48 882,713
234254928 93.31 0.77 27.18 1.16 58.68 1.37 179.17 905,101
249123673 15.63 0.13 0.40 0.02 107.23 2.50 123.26 6,812,938
349962609 8.67 0.07 39.01 1.67 19.74 0.46 67.41 1,173,892
311503667 38.94 0.32 7.47 0.32 7.77 0.18 54.18 486,338
4 Discussion
We believe that the empirical analysis presented in this paper led to novel in-
sights into the structure and behavior of Bitcoin mining pools. Our longitudinal
analysis of mining pool market shares, which is based on a simple yet effective
attribution scheme, outlines the need for open attribution data and agreed upon
reproducible methodologies of how this attribution data is applied. Moreover,
it highlights conflicts and gray spots in block attributions not visible in aggre-
gated pie charts and confirms centralization tendencies in Bitcoin mining, as
pointed out by previous research. It also confirms concerns targeting the recent
domination of three to four mining pools, which could surpass the 50% security
threshold when combining their mining power.
Additionally, we were able to trace payout transactions within a one-month
observation period, found addresses belonging to individual miners and could
group them into clusters representing actors in the Bitcoin ecosystem. We showed
that the distribution of shares within analyzed mining pools is also highly cen-
tralized and that the majority of mining rewards distributed by a pool is received
by a relatively small set of actors. We also saw that individual miners conduct
cross-pool mining and that geographically co-located exchange services and wal-
let services hold large shares within pools and push towards centralization within
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mining pools. Plus, our dataset is openly available and our method is repro-
ducible and could be extended over additional mining pools, longer observation
periods and other cryptocurrencies.
We are well aware that our approach has a number of limitations. First, we
focus our in-depth analysis of mining pools on a restricted set of pools (the top
three pools) and an observation period of one month. For AntPool in particular,
we selected only payout transactions following the pattern 101 outputs, even
though, by manual investigation we noticed that the chain of payments some-
times continued with a different amount of outputs. Improvements in this aspect
are possible and are part of our future works. Other, non-investigated smaller
pools could be less centralized and follow other payout patterns. We address
this limitation, by binding our results to specific, in our opinion systemically
relevant, mining pools. This ensures, that we are not claiming that we assess the
entire set of mining pools in Bitcoin. Second, we know that the multiple-input
heuristics we used for clustering addresses could lead to false positives (unrelated
addresses are joined together) when transactions are tunneled through Mixing
services (c.f., [22]) and false negatives (mining addresses do not belong to any
cluster) when individual miners create new addresses for each single mining ac-
tivity. However, we are confident of having avoided false positives by applying
strict filtering criteria on mining pool payout patterns and ignoring CoinJoin
transactions. Third, our approach is limited by the extent and quality of the
attribution data (tags) available. Without this information, address clusters re-
main anonymous and inferences about their real-world nature are impossible.
Nevertheless, we believe that such data will increasingly become available in the
near future with the growing popularity of cryptocurrency analytics tools.
Overall, our paper strengthens a line of recent research and community dis-
cussions that suggest skepticism and scrutiny on the decentralization of control
in cryptocurrencies, which is often considered being the key feature distinguish-
ing them from fiat currencies. To plausibly uphold this claim, mining pools as
well as big players in the ecosystem like exchanges, have to find the sweet spot
between acting more transparently to encourage public auditability and the pri-
vacy demands of their users.
5 Conclusions
We present an empirical analysis of the distribution of mining shares within and
across mining pools. Our investigation on the longitudinal evolution of mining
pools confirms centralization among a relatively small number of mining pools,
three to four controlling more than 50% of the hash rate. Further inspection of
the three largest mining pools has shown centralization tendencies also within
those pools, where in each pool less than 18 pools members receive more than
50% of the identified pool payouts. Examination of payments between those
mining pools and actors representing individual miners has revealed cross-pool
mining activity (both at address and cluster level), economic relationships be-
tween operators of geographically co-located mining pools, exchange services and
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wallet providers. Overall, our research supports previous findings and scrutinizes
the decentralization property of cryptocurrencies.
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